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This paper argues that the Enterprise Act 2002 has changed the way those dealing with distressed 
companies are required to behave much more significantly than most commentators realise. The 
motivation for this change lies in the ways in which administrative receivership is destructive of 
social value (in terms of unnecessary job losses and other resource misallocations). The paper 
identifies three such ways, all linked with the fact that receivership ties the office-holder’s duties 
to the interests of the debtor’s main bank. This is undesirable because the bank (a) is usually 
oversecured and thus has little incentive, once receivership is underway, to ensure that financially 
distressed companies would not needlessly be wound up or their businesses liquidated, (b) has the 
benefit of directors’ guarantees, which weakens its incentives to ensure the maximisation of the 
value of the company’s business even in those cases where its proprietary security is insufficient 
to cover what it is owed, and (c) has little incentive in either of these cases to control the costs of 
receiver wastefulness or negligence. These problems are compounded by the fact that the supply 
side of the market for banking services to SMEs is significantly monopolistic. 
 
In order to remedy these defects, Parliament has now imposed upon the administrator the duty to 
attempt a company or business rescue, as appropriate, if either one is in the interests of the 
creditors as a group. This duty is an objective one, is subject to the rationality test, and requires 
the administrator to account for his decision about which objective (company or business rescue) 
is to be pursued. The paper provides an understanding of company rescue consistent with the 
explicit text and legislative history of the statute, and discusses the importance of the quality of 
the company’s pre-distress management to the administrator’s decision about whether to attempt 
such a rescue. 
 
Finally, the mechanisms provided by the statue for an aggrieved party to hold the administrator to 
account are discussed. The paper highlights the importance of three factors. (a) Most 
administrators will be appointed by the company’s main bank. (b) The Insolvency Practitioners 
who act as administrators would be the same individuals who have acted in the past as 
administrative receivers. (c) There has been a paucity of understanding amongst the professionals, 
lawyers and accountants, about the significance of the changes brought about by the Enterprise 
Act. The administrator’s statutory duties to act in the interests of all the creditors as a group and 
to act with reasonable speed and efficiency are examined in the light of these observations. 
 
* Lecturer in Laws, University College London; Research Associate, Centre for Business Research, 
University of Cambridge. I am very grateful to John Armour for many invaluable conversations and 
comments. Many thanks are also due to those who put questions and comments to me at the Current Legal 
Problems lecture, to the participants of a staff seminar at Nottingham Law School, and to John Argenti, 
Rodney Austin, Michael Bridge, Alison Clarke, Look Chan Ho, Alan Katz, Michael Mumford, Dawn 
Oliver, Adrian Walters, two anonymous referees, and in particular, Jeffrey Jowell and Sir Gavin Lightman 
for their help. Of course neither my views nor any mistakes should be attributed to any of them. 
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31. INTRODUCTION 
 
There are reasons to believe that the Enterprise Act 2002 has revolutionised corporate insolvency 
law. But if that is the case, the revolution is a relatively quiet one. Many insolvency professionals 
— lawyers and accountants alike — have not even sensed that the existing order has been 
overthrown. They imagine that the new administration procedure introduced by the Act merely 
disguises administrative receivership so as to render it more generally acceptable. They think that 
while requiring them to jump through some additional but merely formal hoops, the statute 
benignly allows them to conduct business as usual under a new name.1 This paper argues that 
they are wrong. Their mistake has several complex reasons. Here are the most fundamental ones.  
 
First, there is widespread ignorance about the harmful effects of receivership. Many still hold on 
to the Panglossian view that despite all the worries about it,2 receivership is the best system on 
offer. This leads them to think that not much benefit can be expected from moving away from it. 
Second, there is considerable confusion about what the new administration procedure requires. A 
lot has been said about how successfully various interest groups extracted concessions in the 
design of the new procedure from the Government. What is overlooked, however, is that these 
concessions were mostly about the appointment of the administrator. It is true that banks 
extracted the right to make out-of-court appointments of administrators. However, the substance 
of the administrator’s duties emerged virtually undiluted from the original proposals. In 
particular, Parliament has now provided an hierarchical list of objectives that each administration 
must pursue. And importantly, it has imposed upon the administrator a duty to explain his reasons 
for pursuing lower-priority objectives. Third, the administrator’s decision on this point has been 
made subject to the rationality test. These three factors combine to revolutionise completely the 
way the law in this jurisdiction has dealt with distressed companies in the past. However, the 
significance of this potent combination of changes has been missed because this legislation has 
been scrutinised only by company and commercial lawyers, whereas the statutory mechanisms 
bringing them about derive their force mainly from drawing on principles developed by public 
law.  
 
This paper has four aims. It begins by explaining why there needs to be a corporate ‘rescue’ 
mechanism such as administration at all as a supplement to the simpler and better understood 
liquidation procedure. Second, it explains the Government’s motivation in moving away from 
administrative receivership. This is done by examining the relevant empirical evidence to 
understand the way in which receivership operates. Ignorance of this evidence and about how to 
interpret it is, in my view, the main cause of the continuing insistence, especially by insolvency 
practitioners (IPs), that receivership was a wonderful institution whose virtual demise is 
something to be regretted. I will argue instead that this demise was long overdue and ought to be 
celebrated. The paper then homes in on three of the most important features of the new law. It 
asks whether the administrator’s duty to select a purpose for the administration is a subjective or 
an objective one. It explains how the administrator might justifiably choose which objective to 
pursue. And it throws light on potential challenges to the administrator’s decisions and actions. It 
does so by examining the general, overriding duties imposed on the administrator and the 
conflicts of interest he can be expected to face. 
 
1 So e.g., the changes to corporate insolvency law brought about by the Act have been described as “largely 
procedural”; Mark Andrews, “The Enterprise Act: sink or spin?” Recovery (Autumn 2003), 3. 
2 Reflected, e.g., in a thoughtful lecture by Sir Gavin Lightman, “The Challenges Ahead: Address to the 
Insolvency Lawyers’ Association” (1996) JIBL 113. 
4Let me start by setting the terms of the discussion. We are mainly concerned with two formal 
procedures dealing with corporate distress. Under the pre-Enterprise Act law, administrative 
receivership is the preferred mode of debt enforcement against distressed companies by banks 
holding fixed and floating charges over substantially the entire estate of the debtor.3 The 
debenture creating these charges reserves to the chargee the right to appoint an IP to manage the 
company and apply either its income, or the proceeds of sale of the company’s business, towards 
the discharge of the secured debt. Perhaps the most distinctive feature of receivership is the fact 
that the receiver — while regarded as the debtor’s agent — owes his primary (in some important 
respects, exclusive) obligations to the chargee.4 He may choose to deal with the company or its 
assets in a way that directly inflicts harm on junior claimants, as long as he acts in good faith in 
the chargee’s interests.5 While security packages carrying the right to appoint an administrative 
receiver are held by a variety of creditors, banks and other financial institutions are by far the 
most important players in this respect, so it would be convenient to refer to creditors holding such 
global security generically as ‘banks’. 
 
By contrast, the administration procedure introduced by the Enterprise Act6 entails the 
appointment of an Insolvency Practitioner (a) either out of court by a creditor holding global 
security (including a floating charge)7 or the company or its directors,8 or (b) by court order at the 
behest of the company, its directors or any of its creditors.9 Regardless of the manner of his 
appointment, the administrator is an officer of the court,10 is under a primary obligation to act in 
the interests of all the creditors as a whole,11 and to perform his functions with reasonable speed 
and efficiency.12 
2. WHAT SHOULD ‘RESCUE’ PROCEDURES BE DOING? 
 
So why should there be a corporate ‘rescue’ mechanism like administration (or even 
receivership)? When a company becomes unable to pay its debts as they become due,13 why not 
send it into liquidation straight away? It promised to pay back what it was borrowing, and now is 
unable to do so. So why not wind it up? This question is usually answered by drawing a 
distinction between financial distress and economic distress. In some cases, the net present worth 
of the troubled company’s business as a going concern is less than the value of its assets broken 
up and sold separately. This means the business is not viable any more, or in other words, it has 
 
3 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 29(2).  
4 See Downsview Nominees Ltd v. First City Corporation Ltd [1993] AC 295; compare Medforth v Blake 
[2000] Ch 86; but see now Silven Properties Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland [2003] EWCA Civ 1409 (CA). 
5 For a recent example, see Silven Properties Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland [2003] EWCA Civ 1409 (CA). 
6 For a description and analysis of the pre-Enterprise Act equivalent, see Roy Goode, Principles of 
Corporate Insolvency Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, 2nd ed.), Ch. 10.  
7 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1 (all references to paragraphs are to paragraphs of this Schedule, unless 
otherwise stated), paras 14-18. The statute refers to creditors with the benefit of such a security package as 
‘holders of a qualifying floating charge’. For a consideration of whether it any longer makes sense to tie the 
right to appoint an administrator with having the benefit of a floating charge, see Mokal, ‘The Floating 
Charge — An Elegy’, in Sarah Worthington (ed), Commercial Law and Commercial Practice (Oxford: 
Hart, 2003), 479, Section VI. 
8 Paras 22-30. 
9 Paras 10-13. 
10 Para 5. 
11 Para 3(2), subject to para 3(4); discussed below. 
12 Para 4; discussed below. 
13 Insolvency Act 1986 (IA), s. 123. 
5become economically distressed.14 The longer the assets constituting it remain harnessed to their 
current use, the more money that will be lost by all those with claims against the company as a 
group. In such cases, we can see that attempting to save the company or its business as a going 
concern is out of the question. Doing so would not, ex hypothesi, be in the interests of the 
company’s creditors as a whole.15 And even more explicitly, attempting to save the business 
would not be likely to achieve a better result for the creditors as a whole than would be likely if 
the company were wound up.16 So here, the purpose of formal insolvency proceedings should be 
to realise the company’s property in order to make a distribution to its creditors.17 
Alternatively, the company might only be in financial distress. This is another way of saying it is 
cash-flow insolvent, which means simply that it is unable to pay its debts as they arise. This is 
deemed to be the case if the company fails upon demand to repay a debt of at least £750 that has 
become due.18 A company which is only financially distressed is economically viable, and its 
assets might be in their highest value use. However, because these assets happen to be illiquid and 
because large debt repayments are looming, say, it might be rendered incapable of meeting these 
obligations. In this case, the purpose of the insolvency proceedings should be to save either the 
company (about which more later) or its business as a going concern. Given its essential viability, 
dismantling the business would not be in the interests of the company’s creditors, since to break 
up the assets would be to withdraw them from their highest value use and apply them towards 
inferior projects.19 
In the remainder of this paper, then, these are the main standards by which the relevant 
insolvency procedures will be judged. While of course ensuring a quick liquidation of the assets 
of economically distressed companies so that those assets may move to more socially useful 
projects, do these procedures encourage companies that are merely financially distressed to be 
given another chance? The answer is important. A procedure that allows too many such 
companies to be liquidated is contributing to unnecessary job losses and the misallocation of 
social resources. 
 
14 It is important to emphasise here that companies which are economically distressed might still be able to 
continue trading. This is because the notion of economic distress takes into account the return to all the 
productive services constituting the firm (traditionally categorised as land, labour, capital and 
entrepreneurship). If the net returns provided by the firm to these services together is below what they 
would receive in the market, then the firm is economically distressed. However, such a firm could continue 
to pay its creditors on time and in full while, say, providing lower-than-market level profits to the 
entrepreneur or lower-than-market wages to its employees (who nevertheless remain with the firm for 
idiosyncratic reasons). So the point made in the text here should be understood as applying to economically 
distressed companies which are also troubled, in the sense of facing problems meeting their debt 
obligations. The reason is easy to understand. It is only when a company is troubled in this sense that it is 
likely to end up in a formal insolvency proceeding like administration. 
15 Under the Enterprise Act, compare para 3(2). 
16 Compare para 3(1)(b). 
17 Compare para 3(1)(c). Another way of saying the same thing is that for the purposes of the Enterprise 
Act, economic distress should, in general, mark the boundary between the first two potential purposes of 
administration (preservation of the company or its business as a going concern, respectively) and the third 
one (piecemeal liquidation of its assets). It follows that before the administrator can fix the third objective 
as the one he will pursue, he should have reached the conclusion that the company is in economic distress. 
18 See para 111 and s. 123 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
19 Compare para 3(3). For a financially distressed company, the question is whether it is reasonably 
practicable and in the creditors’ interests to save the company itself, or merely its business. 
63. THE HARM DONE BY ADMINISTRATIVE RECEIVERSHIP 
 
It is because administrative receivership was regarded as not giving troubled but essentially 
viable companies or businesses a sufficient chance to be rescued that the Enterprise Act has 
severely restricted its availability. In the White Paper preceding the Act, the Government noted 
“widespread concern as to the extent to which… receivership as a procedure provides adequate 
incentives to maximise economic value” by helping out distressed but viable businesses. The 
ability of the floating charge holder to block administration by appointing a receiver was taken as 
an important reason for the low uptake of administration. This was regarded as undesirable 
because (even) the old administration procedure was a self-consciously ‘rescue’-oriented 
mechanism. The White Paper also highlighted concern about whether receivership provided “an 
acceptable level of transparency and accountability to the range of stakeholders with an interest in 
a company’s affairs, particularly creditors.”20
The way in which the Enterprise Act seeks to address these concerns is examined below. Before 
that, however, we must ask whether the Government was right to accept that receivership was 
inadequate both as a recovery mechanism and in providing transparency and accountability for 
junior claimants (viz., those ranking behind the security-holding bank in the distribution of value 
from the insolvent estate). We must ask these questions because the Government provided no 
evidence that this was in fact the case, and because several commentators have strenuously 
rejected such slurs on receivership.21 Also, if receivership was doing a good job in rescuing 
businesses, then the massive costs of consultation, legislation and displacement of familiar legal 
institutions and practices were and are entirely unjustified. What is more, the new administration 
procedure involves mechanisms of consultation and accountability to a variety of claimants which 
stand in stark contrast to the receiver’s single-minded dedication to the bank’s interests. Keeping 
that in mind, suppose that the law governing receivership was efficient in rescuing viable 
businesses and doing so cost-effectively. In that case, the switch to administration will increase 
the costs borne by the claimants as a group (as the administrator goes about complying with his 
more demanding duties to a broader range of stakeholders) while bringing (ex hypothesi) few 
additional benefits in terms of additional businesses saved from unnecessary liquidation. 
a. Business or Company: What Should be Rescued? 
 
Therefore, it is worth looking a little more carefully at the expressed rationales for the reforms. In 
relation first to the ‘rescue culture’, does the low take-up of administration necessarily mean that 
‘rescues’ do not occur? In order to answer this question, we need to be clear about what 
constitutes corporate rescue. It is important here to distinguish between a company, the legal 
entity that is created for the purpose of carrying on a business, and the productive assets 
constituting that business itself. The company does not itself make products, create jobs, or 
produce revenues. That is what the actual business is all about. So on one understanding of 
 
20 White Paper, Productivity and Enterprise - Insolvency: A Second Chance (London: HMSO, 2001), para 
2.2. 
21 The British Bankers’ Association claims that there is “no evidence that debenture holders destroy viable 
companies through over-hasty appointment of receivers”, and that “receivership is a very successful 
method to transfer a business to new investors”; BBA Response to the Report by the Review Group on 
Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms, available at the URL: 
<http://www.bba.org.uk/public/newsroom/35451/3651?version=1>. The objections to receivership were 
described as “dogma” in an Editorial in the Insolvency Practitioners’ main trade journal; see Recovery 
(Autumn 2003), 2. For the most persuasive and coherent academic defence of receivership, see John 
Armour and Sandra Frisby, “Rethinking receivership” (2001) 21 OJLS 73. 
7‘corporate rescue’, all that is required is that assets which are more valuable as a cohesive 
productive unit than they would be if split apart and sold off piecemeal, should in fact be kept 
together. The business can continue to trade either under the ownership of the original corporate 
entity or through the sale of the productive assets as a going concern. Now whilst administrative 
receivership necessitates the closure of the corporate entity, its defenders endlessly point out that 
this does not necessarily imply the closure of the business. The available empirical data suggest 
that a significant proportion of receiverships result in business rescue. Indeed, under the old law 
— where administration was deliberately designed as a secondary mechanism to cover situations 
where receivership would not be available22 — this proportion was comparable to that achieved 
in administration.23 On this view of ‘corporate rescue’, it would appear misleading to suggest that 
the ability of a floating charge holder to block the appointment of an administrator impedes the 
successful operation of the ‘rescue culture’.  
 
We should not stop here, however.24 There is a more demanding notion of ‘corporate rescue’, 
where some value is placed on the preservation of the old corporate entity itself. Here is one 
understanding of company rescue that, I submit, is implied by the Government’s statements about 
its intentions during the legislative process, and which is also meaningfully different from the sort 
of business rescue discussed above. The company is rescued as a going concern if the original 
legal entity continues to own all or at least a significant part of its pre-distress business. In 
practice, this would generally be a concomitant of a bargain or agreement whereby the shares in 
it, or at least a significant proportion of them, come to be owned by some combination of its 
original, pre-distress creditors and shareholders. Here is the intuition underlying this conception 
of corporate rescue. The primary determinant of whether to aim for a company rescue as opposed 
to a mere business rescue is whether a market sale of the company’s assets is desirable. If it is 
not, then it would be in the interests of all the claimants as a group for those assets to (in effect) 
be sold to the company’s pre-distress creditors and/or its pre-distress shareholders by way of a 
Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA), scheme of arrangement or composition. This brings 
about a company rescue. A market sale of the company’s assets might not be desirable in either or 
 
22 The Cork Committee recommended the introduction of administration as a substitute for administrative 
receivership for companies that had not granted a floating charge to a bank or other secured creditor. The 
veto power given to the floating charge holder over the commencement of administration merely reflected 
the original conception of administration as a secondary route, which would only be pursued where no 
floating charge was in existence. See the Insolvency Law Review Committee, Insolvency Law and Practice 
(Cmnd. 8558, 1982), Ch. 9.  
23 See the figures in the Association of Business Recovery Professionals’ R3 9th Survey of Business 
Recovery in the UK (London: ABRP, 2000), 17. Very importantly, however, given the skewed way in 
which companies would end up in administration (viz., only when they were allowed to do so by the very 
party entitled to initiate receivership), the meaningfulness of comparisons between business rescue rates in 
receivership and pre-Enterprise Act administration is open to very serious doubt. 
24 It is surprising to see how tempted some commentators have been to do so. The British Bankers 
Association probably went the furthest in expressing exaggerated incomprehension even as to the 
possibility that rescue procedures could have any other purpose: “We… assume that there is a 
typographical error in the suggestion [contained in the Report by the Review Group on Company Rescue 
and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms] that the primary object of rescue is companies rather than 
businesses”! See BBA Response to the Report by the Review Group on Company Rescue and Business 
Reconstruction Mechanisms, available at the URL: 
<http://www.bba.org.uk/public/newsroom/35451/3651?version=1>. A similar note of incredulity mixed 
with sarcasm can be detected (though with some exceptions) in the pages of Recovery. The suggestion that 
companies rather than merely businesses might be worthy of rescue has been described as “the 
government’s hang-up” (Rescue, Spring 2003, 31), and being based on little more than a “surprisingly 
steadfast lack of distinction between the company and its business” (Rescue, Autumn 2003, 2). 
8both of two situations: (a) The market for those assets might lack liquidity.25 Or, overlapping with 
this, (b) it might be necessary, in order to derive the best value from those assets, to make them 
available to those with accumulated expertise in their use. This argues in favour of retaining 
(some of) the pre-distress managers of the company, who would often also be the company’s pre-
distress shareholders.26 What constitutes a ‘significant’ proportion (of business and of shares) for 
this purpose, and what combination of pre-distress creditors and shareholders end up being 
shareholders in the ‘rescued’ entity, would of course depend upon the circumstances of the case.27 
What matters is that the original legal entity survives, and that it survives as a commercially 
trading entity. I submit that this is the notion of corporate rescue enshrined in the new 
administration procedure.28 
It is further submitted that this is justifiable for several reasons, only two of which will be 
mentioned here. First, the new procedure may now be invoked by the bank of a distressed 
company without any need to demonstrate the company’s insolvency.29 For reasons I have 
explained elsewhere,30 this is beneficial for all those interested in the company’s undertaking. 
This fact also opens up the possibility, however, that the company placed in administration, while 
distressed, is still solvent. By definition here, the company’s shareholders have a real interest in 
the proceedings, which should be substantively recognised in the procedure by opening up the 
possibility that the company itself would be rescued as a going concern in the sense outlined here. 
Second and taking the same reasoning forward, it would often be the case that the company’s 
directors are in the best position to sense impending crisis. There is great value in providing 
incentives — ‘sticks and carrots’ — for them to take action at that point. For whatever it is worth, 
the ‘stick’ already exists in the form of the wrongful trading provisions in section 214 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986.31 One way of providing the ‘carrots’ would be to ensure that the directors 
— who, for companies most likely to become subject to administration, would also be significant 
shareholders — would have some hope of regaining control and residual claimant status if they 
act at the earliest appropriate moment. A procedure which aims in the first instance at company 
rescue could be expected to provide them the right incentives.32 
b. How Good was Administrative Receivership even in Rescuing Businesses? 
 
Turning secondly to the concern with the ‘inefficiency’ of administrative receivership: it is 
undoubtedly the case that a senior creditor — such as a bank — may have perverse incentives to 
close down a distressed business ‘too quickly’. These perverse incentives arise most obviously 
where the bank is ‘oversecured’: in other words, where the value of the assets subject to its 
 
25 This and similar factors are discussed in John Armour and Rizwaan J. Mokal, “Reforming the 
Governance of Corporate Rescue: The Enterprise Act 2002” (forthcoming). 
26 This is discussed below. 
27 In many equity-for-debt swaps, for example, the original shareholders might end up with little or nothing 
of the post-administration company’s equity. 
28 See para 3(1)(a).  
29 Paras 16 (out of court appointment) and 35(2)(a) (appointment by court order). 
30 Mokal, ‘The Floating Charge’, Section III. 
31 For an analysis, see R. Mokal, “An Agency Cost Analysis of the Wrongful Trading Provisions” [2000] 
CLJ 335. 
32 This was explicitly given as the reason for this feature of the Act; see Mr. Douglas Alexander, Minister 
for E-Commerce and Competitiveness, Hansard, 10 April : Column 549; see also Lord McIntosh of 
Haringey, 29 July : Column 766. How tempting this carrot proves is however another question; see John 
Armour and Rizwaan J. Mokal, “Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The Enterprise Act 
2002” (forthcoming). 
9charges is greater, however they are sought to be realised, than the amount owed to the bank.33 In 
this case, the bank will be concerned primarily with how quickly the assets can be sold, as 
opposed to selling them in the way that will produce the greatest returns overall. Yet if the bank is 
not oversecured, it might be thought that the perverse incentive vanishes. For example, if the bank 
is owed £100,000, and the assets will realise £80,000 on a break-up basis but £120,000 in a 
going-concern sale, then the bank will prefer a going-concern sale regardless of whether this 
takes longer.34 The extent of the perverse incentive problem is therefore an empirical question, 
depending on the relative frequency with which banks find themselves ‘oversecured’ and 
‘undersecured’. Now it is generally recognised that banks are often undersecured in insolvency 
proceedings.35 This is supported by the results of the Association of Business Recovery 
Professionals’ (‘APRB’) survey of its members, which reports that the average recovery by 
secured creditors — across all types of insolvency procedure — in 1997-98 was only 37% of the 
face value of their debt, and in 1998-99, 53%.36 If banks do not recover in full, then it might be 
said they are by definition undersecured. It might therefore appear that the perceived inefficiency 
of administrative receivership had been significantly overstated. 
 
However, this conclusion would be erroneous. There are several reasons to think essentially 
viable businesses are frequently closed down under the receivership system. First, note that it is 
less useful to look at the mean recoveries of banks, and quite crucial to examine the proportion of
receiverships in which banks are oversecured.37 It is easy to understand why. In any particular 
case, the bank is either under- or oversecured. In cases where the bank is undersecured, let us 
grant (contrary to what will be argued next) that the receiver has the right incentives to maximise 
value anyway. Consideration of the bank’s average returns is therefore irrelevant. On the other 
hand, where the bank is oversecured, ruminating over the bank’s average returns over thousands 
of insolvencies is unlikely to provide the receiver with additional reasons in this particular one to 
maximise value beyond the point at which the bank recovers fully. So the decisions of receivers, 
acting primarily on the bank’s behalf, are predominantly affected not by the bank’s average 
recoveries over many insolvencies, but by how much the bank is likely to recover in the particular 
receivership the receiver is conducting. It is that assessment which shapes their incentives about 
whether to go for an overly hasty ‘fire-sale’ of the business or its constituent assets.  
 
33 See J Armour and S Frisby, ‘Rethinking Receivership’ (2001) 21Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 73, 90. 
34 This is of course subject to the observation that, despite his obligation to obtain a “fair” or “proper” value 
when disposing of the charged assets, the receiver has little incentive to bargain for a price over and above 
that required to meet the bank’s claim and his own costs. Remember that going concern sales are often all 
about sensing the movements of and searching through the market, and then about bargaining to obtain the 
best price available. In short, going concerns sales are about the right timing. However, the receiver is 
under no obligation to junior claimants with respect to the timing of the sale; Silven Properties Ltd v Royal 
Bank of Scotland [2003] EWCA Civ 1409 (CA). So on the facts assumed in the text, (a) if the receivership 
costs are fixed at, say, £12,000, then the receiver has no incentive to search for and bargain towards a price 
higher than £112,000, which results in a loss of £8,000 to junior claimants (at least, since there might also 
be losses of idiosyncratic value), and (b) if the costs are not fixed in some way, the receiver would have an 
incentive to realise the assets at a higher price as long as he could capture the additional returns by inflating 
his costs. This is discussed further in the text, below. 
35 Armour and Frisby, “Rethinking Receivership”, 96. 
36 Society of Practitioners of Insolvency, 8th Survey of Company Insolvency in the United Kingdom 
(London: SPI, 1999), 14-15; Association of Business Recovery Professionals, R3 9th Survey of Business 
Recovery in the UK (London: ABRP, 2000), 18. However, cf Julian Franks and Oren Sussman, The Cycle 
of Corporate Distress, Rescue and Dissolution: A Study of Small and Medium Size UK Companies 
(London: IFA Working Paper 306-2000, 2000) (hereafter, Cycle), 14. 
37 Another way of making this point is to say that what matters is not so much the means as the medians of 
banks’ recoveries in receivership. 
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Looked at in this way, the position changes dramatically. Evidence, including that given on 
behalf of the banks themselves, indicates that they are oversecured in over half of all 
receiverships.38 From what has been said above, it follows that acting on the bank’s behalf, 
receivers do not have the correct incentives to maximise value in over half of cases.39 On this 
evidence alone, receivership starts looking like a highly value-destructive institution: one in every 
two receiverships potentially allows a viable business to be broken up. It is hard to overstate the 
significance of this conclusion. As a mechanism for generating the correct incentives for the 
prevention of unnecessary job losses and resource misallocation, receivership is — on the facts as 
admitted by the banks themselves — as reliable as the toss of a coin. 
 
In fact, things are worse even than this. The second reason for thinking that receiverships are 
socially harmful has a broader ambit yet. Remember that banks have often taken alternative forms 
of security to cover the debt owed to them. Most notably for our purposes, they extract personal 
guarantees from the shareholder-directors of over half the firms to which they lend.40 Where such 
security has been provided, the receiver would have less incentive to ensure a value-maximising 
disposal of the business, even in those cases where the bank is undersecured. Acting primarily in 
the bank’s interests, he will expend time and resources attempting to seek a value-maximising 
disposal of the business to the point where the net addition to the bank’s overall recovery from 
doing so equals the net addition to that recovery through a personal action by the bank against the 
surety-directors. This effect is strengthened by another important factor: other things being equal, 
banks are likely to extract personal guarantees from directors precisely in those cases where they 
expect to end up undersecured. It follows that some value would be lost in overly hasty fire-sales 
even when the bank is not oversecured.41 
c. The direct costs of receivership 
 
We should also consider the direct costs of the process of receivership. For a long time, one of the 
main defences made of this mechanism was that it takes less time and costs less money. We now 
 
38 See British Bankers’ Association, BBA Response to the Report by the Review Group on Company Rescue 
and Business Reconstruction Mechanisms, (‘Our own experience suggests that we obtain full recovery in 
something nearer to 50% of [receivership] cases’). This is reinforced by the finding by Franks and Sussman 
that the median recovery in receivership for one of the banks in their study was 100%; Cycle, 14. Even 
more directly, they found that the figures available ex ante to the banks themselves indicate that banks are 
generally (though not invariably) oversecured; see Cycle, p. 9, which shows that the collateral held by the 
banks as a proportion of what they were owed was 103.7%, 74.6% and 118.5%. Older, less reliable 
evidence — because it is based on surveys of insolvency practitioners rather than on the banks’ records — 
comes from SPI (now, the ABRP), which reports that banks recovered fully in 19% of receiverships; 8th 
Survey, 4. 
39 Even the less reliable ABRP figure suggests receivers are under-incentivised in around a fifth of all cases 
— not exactly a negligible proportion. 
40 Cycle, 9; the figures are 60.4%, 51% and 55% for the three banks. 
41 Importantly, another effect of the existence of director guarantees is the contribution they make to the 
control of director misbehaviour. This leads to a decrease in the probability that a business would become 
distressed in the first place and thus enhances the value of all the claims against the company. This is 
explained in Mokal, ‘The Search for Someone to Save’ [2002] OJLS 687, and especially at 697-8, 708-15 
and 721-7. It is of course an empirical question whether the social loss resulting from the first effect (fire-
sales of viable businesses) is greater or smaller than the social gain resulting from the second (control of 
director misbehaviour). Either way, some viable firms are closed down because the primary beneficiary of 
receivers’ duties has alternative ways of claiming on the debt owed to it. We therefore have reason to 
consider alternatives to receivership that would allow the positive effects of directors’ guarantees to persist 
while reducing the perverse incentives of the IP responsible for dealing with a distressed business. 
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know that this popular prejudice was just that: a prejudice.42 Receivership might have been quick 
but it was certainly not cheap. The procedure costs on average up to a quarter of the value of the 
insolvent estate.43 I have pointed out elsewhere that a process that consumes such a large 
proportion of the estate it is meant to be distributing to a pre-determined group of claimants is 
intrinsically absurd.44 The process sold for being cheap is hugely more expensive than 
comparable procedures elsewhere. It would be illustrative to make some quick international 
comparisons. Notice the distinction between ‘debtor-in-possession’ systems where the pre-
distress management is left in charge of the company during the formal insolvency proceedings, 
and ‘management displacement’ systems where the pre-distress management is deposed or its 
powers suspended in favour of an outside expert (official or private). As a starting point, we can 
expect management displacement regimes to involve greater direct costs, incurred because of the 
employment of the new, distress-oriented manager.45 Keeping this in mind, it would be fruitful to 
compare both types of regime with receivership. Receivership itself is of course a management 
displacement regime, so let us take such systems first. A well-known study reported results for a 
Swedish regime dealing with corporate distress. Here, the initiation of the formal proceedings 
immediately displaces the management in favour of a court-appointed trustee who owes fiduciary 
obligations to creditors. In this system, and for companies of a comparable size and other 
characteristics similar to those undergoing receivership in this jurisdiction, the total direct costs of 
the proceedings (including lawyers’ and consulting fees and administrative costs) is 13.2% 
(median) of the value of the distressed company’s estate.46 And under a similar Finnish regime, a 
study of rescue proceedings concerning comparable companies showed that the total direct costs 
of the proceedings are 14.7% (median).47 Turning now to the most famous debtor-in-possession 
regime, and focussing once again on companies with characteristics similar to those undergoing 
receivership, the figure for total direct costs in US Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11 proceedings is 
4.7% (median).48 
In view of the empirical evidence discussed above, this should come as no surprise. Receivers 
owe primary obligations to banks. Banks are concerned with ensuring high recoveries for 
themselves. They recover fully in around half of receiverships. In many — perhaps most — 
others, they have methods of recovery (like directors’ guarantees) that do not require the 
 
42 Nor was this prejudice universally shared; see e.g. G. Lightman, “The Challenges Ahead”, 113-116. 
43 Cycle, 14; Julian Franks and Oren Sussman, ‘Resolving financial distress by way of a contract: An 
empirical study of small UK companies’ (22 October, 2000), available at URL: www.ifk-
cfs.de/papers/franks.pdf, p. 19. This is a median figure, in recognition of the great variability of the 
findings. For the sake of completeness, the means for the costs for the three banks studied were 42.4%, 
24.3% and 38.7%; “Resolving”, Table 3, Panel D. 
44 Mokal, “The Floating Charge”, 497. 
45 Note however that the retention of pre-distress managers during the insolvency proceedings might create 
other problems, e.g. a bias in favour of rescue attempts even when the troubled company is economically 
distressed so that the rescue is doomed to failure, or where the company, while viable, has been brought 
into distress precisely because of the incompetence of its managers. The point is that while the direct costs 
of debtor-in-possession systems might be lower than those of management displacement ones, the overall 
costs to society of failed rescues or the continuation of economically distressed companies might well be 
higher. 
46 Karin Thornburn, “Bankruptcy Auctions: Costs, Debt Recovery and Firm Survival” (2000) 58 Journal of 
Financial Economics 337, 355. 
47 Abraham Ravid and Stefan Sundgren, “The Comparative Efficiency of Small-Firm Bankruptcies: A 
Study of the US and Finnish Bankruptcy Codes” (1998) 27 Financial Management 28, Section IV. 
48 Stephen Ferris and Robert Lawless, “The Expenses of Financial Distress: The Direct Costs Of Chapter 
11” (2000) 61 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 629, 651. This is consistent with our initial surmise 
that the direct costs of debtor-in-possession systems would be lower than those of management 
displacement ones. 
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maximisation of the value, net of costs, of the insolvent estate. So beyond the point at which the 
bank recovers fully, the costs of the receiver’s actions — including grossly wasteful or negligent 
ones — falls not on the bank but on junior claimants. Junior claimants, however, while obviously 
affected by his actions, cannot hold the receiver to account.49 They are vulnerable to gratuitous 
harm50 inflicted by someone dealing with what in effect is their property51 without having any 
meaningful remedy against him… a situation unknown to the law except in this domain!52 And 
lest it be thought this suggestion of receiver wastefulness is merely theoretical, there is in fact 
strong empirical support for it. Evidence indicates that when receiverships are tendered out, costs 
fall dramatically, to around 14.5%.53 Notice that this figure is very much in line with that reported 
above for other management displacement regimes. The effect of tendering out receiverships is of 
course to focus the burden of any wasteful behaviour onto the insolvency practitioner concerned. 
The striking reduction in costs — and the fact that the reduced costs align closely with those in 
systems where the outside manager owes duties to all the creditors — therefore indicates the 
extent to which the expenses of receivership (of the usual non-tendered out variety) are inflated 
because of receiver wastefulness. 
 
Arguably, Parliament saw the potential for just this type of motivation cost to be acute in the 
institution of receivership when it provided a power for the liquidator to approach the court to set 
the receiver’s remuneration.54 However, the courts (here as in so much else to do with 
receivership) destroyed the usefulness of this provision by insisting that they would only 
intervene if the level of remuneration set in the debenture was plainly excessive.55 Given that 
standard terms in debentures provide that the receiver’s remuneration would be fixed by reference 
to the charging practices of the receiver’s firm,56 and given also that the motivation costs 
mentioned above could be expected to be endemic within the institution of receivership 
regardless of the receiver’s firm,57 the practical effect of this approach was to render the statutory 
provisions nugatory.58 
d. Receiver opportunism 
 
Receivers are also now known to engage in opportunistic behaviour on behalf of their appointor 
by attributing some costs to the floating charge instead of the fixed one, with a view to inflating 
the recoveries under the latter.59 This is a practice which does cause loss to be moved from the 
 
49 See now Silven Properties Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland [2003] EWCA Civ 1409. 
50 ‘Gratuitous harm’ in the sense that its infliction is not required, on any reasonable view, in order for the 
receiver to obtain the best outcome for his appointor. A recent example is provided both by the facts and 
the decision in Silven Properties Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland.
51 See e.g. West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. (in liq.) v Dodd [1988] B.C.L.C. 250, 252-3 and IA, s. 214 etc. 
52 Contrast, e.g., the position of company directors, trustees, mortgagees in possession, ordinary agents 
dealing with their principal’s property, bailees, etc. 
53 Franks and Sussman, “Resolving financial distress”, 33.  
54 IA, s. 36 (this provision makes no explicit reference to indemnity or reimbursement, though the argument 
in the text here applies to these as much as it does to the receiver’s remuneration); see also Companies Act 
1948, s. 371(1). 
55 Re Potters Oils Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 210. 
56 Lingard, Bank Security Documents (London, Butterworths, 1993 3rd ed.), para. 7-04. 
57 Since the oversecured bank “without risk can afford to be generous” in agreeing costs with the receiver 
when they are to be paid out of money otherwise destined for “the open unguarded pocket” of the 
distressed company’s unsecured creditors; G. Lightman, “The Challenges Ahead”, 115-116. 
58 For consideration of a preferable approach, see the discussion in Section 5, below. 
59 Franks and Sussman, ‘Resolving financial distress’ at 18. A simple numerical illustration would help in 
grasping this point. Suppose that assets subject to the fixed charge are sold for £100, those subject to the 
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party best placed to deal with it ex ante,60 to those worse placed to do so.61 This is doubly the case 
since it is unpredictable when such behaviour might benefit the bank and when in turn a receiver 
might resort to it. So the fact that it might happen is unlikely to bring any (even theoretical) 
compensating benefits, in the form of lower interest rates from the bank, say. 
e. A market solution? 
 
Finally and most broadly, let us postulate that one of the services provided by banks is a system 
to reduce the sort of shirking and incompetence on part of receivers that might lead to the closure 
of essentially viable businesses, and receiver wastefulness that results in the inflation of costs.62
The social value of this service exceeds its private value to the bank (a) in those cases where it is 
oversecured, and (b) in those cases where it is undersecured but has the benefit of directors’ 
guarantees, beyond the point where it would find it cheaper to pursue a personal claim against the 
directors than to ensure a value-maximising disposal of the business. The bank charges for this 
service by adding a premium to the cost of credit. Companies have an incentive to pay this 
premium because, as noted, their directors have often guaranteed the bank’s debt, and because 
they would also have lent significant amounts to their company.63 Therefore, they would wish to 
ensure that should insolvency occur, the maximum value would be squeezed out of the business. 
It would not necessarily matter that guarantors and junior creditors could not proceed directly 
against the receiver if they suspected misbehaviour (overly hasty liquidation, inflation of costs, 
etc.) on his part. As a group, directors in the market for this service would simply shop around for 
banks which had invested in building up a reputation for hiring the right sort of receivers, and in 
exercising an appropriate level of control over them. 
 
At this point, however, we should notice the supply-side structure of the market in banking 
services in this country. This is highly uncompetitive, with the big four groups of banks 
exercising significant monopoly power by virtue of their control of around 80% of that market 
between them.64 And under the receivership system, banks have significant monopoly power in 
 
floating charge fetch another £100, and the receiver’s total costs are £50. Assume also that the secured 
creditor (holding both fixed and floating charges) and preferential creditors are owed £200 each. Recall that 
costs attributed to realising assets subject to the floating charge have to be paid in priority to statutory 
preferential debts. Suppose first that the receiver attributes half of his costs each to the realisation of fixed 
and floating charge assets. In this case, the secured creditor receives £75 (£100 from the sale of fixed 
charge assets minus the receiver’s costs of £25), and preferential creditors get £75 (mutatis mutandis). 
However, if the receiver attributes only a quarter of his costs to the realisation of fixed charge assets and 
the rest to the realisation of floating charge ones, then the secured creditor gets £87.50 and preferential 
creditors receive only £62.50. 
60 Viz., the bank, which can adjust rates and other terms to compensate itself for expected losses. 
61 The Crown in right of unpaid taxes, or employees in right of back pay, etc. Such parties cannot of course 
adjust the terms on which they become the company’s creditors. 
62 The constituents of this system would include, e.g., (a) a mechanism to pick an IP with the desired 
reputation, (b) a method of telling economically distressed firms apart from those which are merely 
financially distressed, (c) a way of verifying this to the receiver and if necessary, before a court, (d) 
benchmarks for the sort of costs reasonably to be expected of particular types of receivership, and (e) a 
method of dealing with any additional risks created by the line of authority stemming from Re Vimbos Ltd 
[1900] 1 Ch 470 in attempting to control the receiver once receivership in underway. 
63 Cycle, 7-8.  
64 See e.g. Don Cruikshank, Competition in UK Banking (London: HM Treasury, March 2000), Ch. 5, 
especially pp. 162-167; and the Competition Commission, The Supply of Banking Services by Clearing 
Banks to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (London: HMSO, March 2002), in particular, the 
Commission’s conclusions on complex monopoly effects and the harm thereby done to the public interest 
at pp 128-130 and 137. 
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the provision of the service described above not only because of the structure of the market, but 
also (as noted) because they are the primary and often effectively the sole beneficiaries of 
receivers’ duties. As with any good or service supplied monopolistically, the implication is that 
the level of monitoring etc. of receiver misbehaviour provided by banks is lower than the social 
optimum and the price is higher. In other words, the result is the closure of some essentially 
viable businesses and the inflation of receivership costs, this time because the banks exercise a 
less than optimal level of control over receiver shirking, incompetence and wastefulness. And the 
control that does exist comes at a price which destroys more consumer (junior claimant) surplus 
than it adds to producer (bank) surplus. These are the dead-weight costs of tying receivers’ duties 
to banks’ interests.65 
f. Conclusions on Receivership and the Value of Enhanced Accountability 
 
This discussion makes it clear very significant value is probably being wasted because of the 
perverse structure of receivership, in the form of unnecessary job losses, resource misallocation, 
and wastefully inflated costs. An improved mechanism for dealing with corporate distress would 
be geared towards salvaging this value. We can draw several lessons about the design of a less 
socially harmful mechanism for dealing with corporate distress. First, it would pay to orient the 
duties of the IP charged with ensuring a value-maximising disposal of distressed businesses 
towards the true residual legal claimants in particular insolvencies. Second, the IPs’ duties should 
be shaped by the interests of a party not easily able to ensure repayment of its loan by means 
independent of (a) the maximisation of the value of the insolvent estate, and (b) the control of the 
costs of the mechanism. Third and distinctly, the improved system would not tie the obligations 
of the IP (exclusively or even primarily) to the interests of the monopoly power-wielding banks. 
And finally, the IP should be effectively accountable, as to the discharge of his duties, to the 
parties to whom the duties are owed.  
 
Evidence suggests that the first three requirements are primarily fulfilled by the shareholder-
directors of the sort of companies that most frequently become subject to formal insolvency 
proceedings at the present, and which could be expected to be the most frequent entrants into 
administration. Most such companies are small and closely held.66 Recall that the shareholder-
directors of these companies have guaranteed the bank’s debt (in between 50% and 60% of 
receivership cases). They have also lent to their company sums that “in absolute size… may be 
significant” for them: evidence indicates that on average, something like 2.4% to 6% of the 
troubled company’s debt is owed to its directors.67 Shareholder-directors would also have made 
idiosyncratic investments in the company, captured by the very useful clichés ‘my name is on the 
door’, or ‘this is my life’s work’. Given therefore that they are likely to consider themselves 
deeply tied up with the fortunes of the company, and given that they would often clearly be its 
residual claimants, shareholder-directors have every incentive to ensure that the company’s value 
would be maximised. A system intent on maximising the value of distressed companies and 
 
65 While the analysis here is mine, this conclusion is entirely consistent with the Competition 
Commission’s findings, referred to above.  
66 ABRP provides evidence that 80% of the companies undergoing formal insolvency proceedings had less 
than 14 employees, and that both the assets and the liabilities of around 90% of these companies was less 
than £5m. Further, only 2% of the companies engaged in an insolvency procedure were quoted on a 
recognised stock exchange, no share capital was held by institutional investors in 93% of the cases, and in 
only 2% of such proceedings had the insolvent firm benefited from a rights issue or other equity investment 
in the 12 months leading upto the insolvency proceedings; see Survey of Business Recovery in the UK: 9th. 
Survey (2001, available at URL: < http://www.r3.org.uk/pdf/09th_Company_survey.pdf>), pp. 7, 8, and 12.  
67 Cycle, pp. 7-8. 
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businesses would therefore orient towards them — at least presumptively — the duties of the IP 
presiding over the insolvency proceedings.   
 
It is also interesting to study the position of the Crown. It is often a primary residual claimant in 
insolvency proceedings by virtue of the subrogation of the National Insurance Fund to a 
significant chunk of the preferential claims of employees,68 and because of its claims for unpaid 
tax etc. As things stand, it is a ‘non-adjusting’ creditor, unable to exercise any influence on the 
size of its recoveries except by controlling IP misbehaviour and the costs of the mechanism 
dealing with corporate distress. And because the rates of tax, VAT and employer contributions to 
the National Insurance Fund etc. are not set in view of the likelihood of the insolvency of a 
particular company and thus of its need for monitoring of IP misbehaviour, the Crown cannot 
pass on its costs to any other party. It cannot therefore exploit any sort of monopoly power in the 
way it would exercise control over IP misbehaviour. It would therefore seem that in an improved 
corporate distress mechanism, the IP would be accountable to the Crown. This reasoning repeats 
itself (though with varying degrees of force) with respect to other parties fulfilling (to 
corresponding degrees) the requirements set out above. 
 
Accountability to these parties can be increased through a variety of means: requiring that 
decisions be taken, or at least confirmed, by a creditors’ meeting rather than the office-holder; 
requiring court supervision of the office-holder’s performance of his functions; or by imposing 
duties on the office holder to take into account the interests of different groups of creditors. It is 
clear that none of these mechanisms is cost-free. However, I have explained above the very 
significant extent to which the lack of accountability in receivership can be expected to lead 
receivers to make decisions that fail to maximise the value realised from the sale of the 
company’s assets and control costs. So the direct costs of increased accountability in an improved 
rescue procedure can be expected to be offset by savings from increased returns generated by 
more accountable office-holders. In addition, to the extent that a system which takes cognisance 
in some appropriate way of the interests of all those it affects is fairer than a system which does 
not, accountability is also a virtue worth pursuing precisely because it conduces to fairness.69 And 
finally, the disregard in which receivership is held in other jurisdictions is both, undoubtedly 
genuine, and linked as well to the justified perception that it is not a ‘collective’ mechanism, that 
(inter alia) it does not ensure that the IP take into account the interests of all the creditors affected 
by his actions.70 To the extent that value is placed in acquiring international acceptability — and 
respectability — for the English system of dealing with corporate distress, we get our final reason 
for ensuring that the system complies genuinely and substantively with the condition precedent 
(as it were) of gaining that acceptability.  
3. THE ADMINISTRATOR’S DUTY TO CHOOSE THE OBJECTIVE OF 
ADMINISTRATION 
 
Let us focus now on some of the most important aspects of the new administration procedure, 
starting with the administrator’s duties. By far the most important decision the administrator is 
called upon to make, and one with the most pervasive effects, is about what objective the 
 
68 By virtue of the obligation of the Secretary of State, through the Redundancy Payment Service, to make 
payments to employees from the National Insurance Fund. 
69 See e.g. the discussion of accountability, regarded as an aspect of efficiency, and its relationship with 
fairness in R. Mokal, “On Fairness and Efficiency” [2003] MLR 452. 
70 See e.g. the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, conferring automatic recognition to collective 
insolvency proceedings throughout the European Union, but excluding administrative receivership from its 
ambit; Regulation 1346/2000 EC [2000] OJ L160/1, Annex A. 
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administration should be directed at achieving. The paragraph setting out the menu of choices 
deserves to be reproduced in full: 
 
3 (1) The administrator of a company must perform his functions with the objective of- 
(a) rescuing the company as a going concern, or 
(b) achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would 
be likely if the company were wound up (without first being in 
administration), or 
(c) realising property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or 
preferential creditors. 
(2) Subject to sub-paragraph (4), the administrator of a company must perform his 
functions in the interests of the company’s creditors as a whole. 
(3) The administrator must perform his functions with the objective specified in sub-
paragraph (1)(a) unless he thinks either- 
(a) that it is not reasonably practicable to achieve that objective, or 
(b) that the objective specified in sub-paragraph (1)(b) would achieve a better 
result for the company’s creditors as a whole. 
(4) The administrator may perform his functions with the objective specified in sub-
paragraph (1)(c) only if- 
(a) he thinks that it is not reasonably practicable to achieve either of the 
objectives specified in sub-paragraph (1)(a) and (b), and 
(b) he does not unnecessarily harm the interests of the creditors of the company 
as a whole. 
 
It is obvious that the administrator’s decision on these matters will shape the entire course of 
administration, so it is important to understand the exact nature of his duty with respect to it. The 
statute speaks of his “thinking” about what would be in the collective interest of creditors or 
about whether a particular course of action would be reasonably practicable. Which one of the 
objectives the administrator may properly pursue depends on his coming to “think” that certain 
factors are present or absent, and that certain conditions are or are not met. So how would the 
administrator discharge his obligations? That he does so in an open and transparent manner was 
clearly regarded as important by Parliament. Paragraph 49 provides that: 
 
49 (1) The administrator of a company shall make a statement setting out proposals for 
achieving the purpose of administration. 
(2) [This] statement… must, in particular —… 
(c) where applicable, explain why the administrator thinks that the objective 
mentioned in paragraph 3(1)(a) [saving the company as a going concern] or 
(b) [primarily, saving the business as a going concern] cannot be achieved. 
 
So what is the cumulative effect of these provisions on the nature of the administrator’s duties? In 
particular, must he comply with an objective or a subjective test in coming to settle upon the 
purpose of administration? The answer may seem to lie in the apparent subjectivity of the way in 
which the administrator’s decision is reached: he must come to “think” that this or that state of 
affairs exists, that X or Y would be in the best interests of the creditors, and that outcome A is not 
reasonably practicable but outcome B is. For this reason, it might be thought that the 
administrator’s duty to settle upon a purpose for the administration is of a subjective nature. The 
implication would then seem to be that once the administrator declares his “thinking” one way or 
the other, that is more or less the end of the matter (subject to questions of good faith), and that it 
would be very difficult to mount a challenge to his decisions on this point. 
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I submit that this view is erroneous.71 First and most obviously, Parliament has provided a 
hierarchy of possible objectives, and clearly intended to prioritise company or business rescue, as 
appropriate, over mere realisation of the company’s assets. It is for this reason that lower priority 
objectives are made available to the administrator only if an appropriate combination of the 
conditions listed in paragraph 3 (3) (a) and (b) and (4) (a) and (b) are satisfied.72 Second, the 
apparently unregulated language of the administrator coming to “think” that these circumstances 
are present intersects repeatedly and meaningfully with statements, not phrased in terms of his 
“thinking”, of the duties that must be complied with for there to be a proper exercise of this 
discretion to choose. The administrator is under an ever-present obligation not unnecessarily to 
harm the interests of the creditors as a whole. Note that the duty is not to refrain from doing what 
he thinks would harm creditors unnecessarily; rather, he must refrain from actions that, quite 
simply, unnecessarily harm the creditors. Subject to this, and with the exception of the situation 
where he thinks the achievement of neither of the two higher priority objectives is reasonably 
practicable, he must perform his functions in the interests of the creditors as a whole. Again, the 
duty is not to act merely in a way which he thinks is in the interests of the creditors. It is clear, 
then, that the administrator may only select either of the first two objectives while complying 
with his duty to act in the interests of creditors as a whole, and that this duty is independent of his 
“thinking”. It is also clear that he may only choose the third objective while (among other things) 
complying with his duty not to inflict unnecessary harm to those interests, which duty also is 
independent of his “thinking”. The administrator is also under an overall duty to perform his 
functions as quickly and efficiently as is reasonably practicable. Absent once again is any 
reference to his thinking. 
 
Next, we should note that in exercising his functions, the administrator acts as the company’s 
agent, and is required, upon appointment, to take custody or control of all of the property to 
which he thinks the company is entitled, and to manage the company’s affairs.73 Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, the administrator, as a person undertaking responsibility to act on behalf of the 
company and entrusted with the care of its property and its management, owes fiduciary 
obligations to it.74 This means that the discretion to settle upon the objective for the 
administration — the exercise of which, as noted, will underlie and shape the character of the 
entire process of administration — is subject to the fiduciary duty to ascertain the statutorily 
defined circumstances which make one or other of the objectives the appropriate one to pursue.75 
71 The following discussion draws on Armour and Mokal, “Corporate Rescue”. 
72 That there is a statutory hierarchy of possible objectives is clear not just from the structure of the 
statutory text but also from the legislative history. During the passage of the Enterprise Bill, Ministers 
stated repeatedly in Parliament that the government wanted “to put company rescue at the heart of 
insolvency procedures because we want to save companies which have a decent chance of survival so that 
they are not driven to the wall unnecessarily”; Hansard, HL Deb 2 July 2002, Col 188 (Lord MacIntosh of 
Haringey). 
73 Paras 69, 67 and 68. 
74 A useful recent general description of the factors giving rise to fiduciary obligations may be found in 
Peskin v Anderson [2001] BCLC 372, [34] (Mummery LJ). That the administrator is a fiduciary is 
confirmed by Oldham v Kyrris EWCA [2003] Civ 1506; [2004] BPIR 165, [143] (Jonathan Parker LJ) (the 
case was decided under the old law, but its reasoning applies equally to the administration regime set up by 
the Enterprise Act). 
75 “The existence of the fiduciary duty on the part of trustees governing the exercise of their fiduciary 
powers requires trustees to inform themselves of the matters which are relevant to the decision”, per 
Lightman J in Abacus Trust Co (Isle of Man) Ltd v Barr [2003] EWHC 114 (Ch), [2003] All ER (D) 79, 
[16], citing Scott v National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty [1998] 2 All ER 705, 
717. In the latter case, Robert Walker J also stated that such relevant matters “may not be limited to simple 
matters of fact but will, on occasion (indeed, quite often) include taking advice from appropriate experts”. 
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Thirdly, therefore, the administrator must choose which objective to pursue rationally.
Legislative history leaves no doubt but that the administrator’s most fundamental decision has 
been designed to be subject to the rationality test.76 This is in line with the position of other 
fiduciaries, and it is submitted that the courts will draw on the case law providing substance to the 
rationality test in the context of other fiduciaries to flesh out the standard by which the 
administrator’s decision-making is to be judged.77 It is clear that two competing values are at play 
here. First, the legislature intended that as far as possible, the courts should not be called upon to 
“second-guess the commercial judgment of administrators” willy-nilly, and that, “whenever 
possible, lawyers [should be kept] away from what otherwise would be more expeditious and 
business-friendly processes.”78 Second, however, there was the crucial concern — motivating this 
whole process of consultation and legislation — to save viable companies and businesses, to 
protect the interests of junior claimants, and to make the administrator accountable to them.79 The 
way chosen to mediate between these values was the invocation of the rationality test. The 
requirement for the administrator to act rationally could be considered to be at the very heart of 
the new procedure, and coupled with the new statutory menu of objectives for administration, 
constitutes a significant shift in the way corporate rescue is conceived in this jurisdiction.  
 
The rationality test serves the value of expert commercial decision-making by ensuring that what 
will matter is not so much whether the court considers that, on the basis of the evidence available 
at the time, it was reasonably practicable to achieve (a), etc, but rather whether the court 
considers that a reasonable administrator might have concluded this. The administrator’s duty to 
select the correct objective is likely to be interpreted by courts so as to give considerable credence 
to the exercise of the administrator’s business judgment. But the second value — that viable 
companies and businesses are rescued, the interests of junior claimants are protected and the 
administrator is made accountable to them — is also represented via the administrator’s duty to 
act rationally.  
 
In order to understand what the rationality requirement entails in this context, we may start by 
noting the close analytical connections between the administrator’s fiduciary duty to act 
rationally, and the law governing judicial review of administrative (‘public’) action. The 
principles of judicial review specifically require the challenged public action to live up to the 
 
76 See e.g. Hansard,10 April 2002 : Columns 569-70 (“The word ‘thinks’ in those paragraphs means that 
the administrator will have to reach a considered view [about which objective to pursue]. In such situations, 
the administrator’s decision would be subject to a rationality test by which it would be challenged if it 
could be shown that no reasonable administrator would have acted in such a way in those circumstances”); 
29 July 2002 : Column 768 (“The present wording would mean that if the administrator’s view were then to 
be tested, it would be subject to a ‘rationality’ test — that is, his decisions would be subject to successful 
challenge if it could be shown that no reasonable administrator would have acted in such a way in the 
particular circumstances of a case.”), and 21 October 2002 : Column 1105 (“If necessary, we would expect 
the courts to assess whether the office holder, in this case the administrator, has been rational in his 
decision. We are not seeking to apply any other test.”). 
77 .Several constituents have been identified of the defect now generically referred to as irrationality. For 
example, a decision by trustees is irrational if “it can be shown that [they] considered the wrong question, 
or that, although they purported to consider the right question they did not really apply their minds to it or 
perversely shut their eyes to the facts…”; Dundee General Hospital v Walker [1952] SC (HL) 78, 92, per 
Lord Reid, who goes on to say that in this case, “there was no true decision and the court will intervene”. 
78 Hansard, 10 April 2002 : Columns 556-7, 21 October 2002 : Column 1105, etc. 
79 See e.g. Hansard, 10 April 2002 : Columns 566 and 570, and 29 July 2002 : Column 768, etc. 
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demands of rationality,80 and the similarity between the public law and the fiduciary notions of 
rationality has been noted in the past. The Court of Appeal has remarked after a review of the 
relevant case law that it is “no coincidence that courts, considering the exercise of discretionary 
powers by those to whom such powers have been entrusted (albeit in different contexts), should 
reach similar and consistent conclusions, and should express those conclusions in much the same 
language”.81 Several first instance courts have expressed similar sentiments.82 The courts have 
also been concerned, however, to distinguish the “much more developed”83 body of judicial 
review principles grouped together as representing the requirements of rationality, from the 
principles applied to fiduciaries by private law.84 One reason for doing so appears to be that the 
public law requirements of rationality are more demanding than their private law counterparts, so 
that judicial review principles have to be more developed than those applicable to fiduciaries in 
order to ensure that those more severe requirements have been satisfied. Two indicia have 
repeatedly been identified as marking the two areas apart from each other.85 The first is the duty 
to give reasons, which plays a large and important role in ensuring the rationality of public 
decision making. Such a duty is said to have a role only in exceptional instances of the discharge 
of fiduciary obligations,86 with at least one distinguished judge having commented upon the 
“widely-held view that trustees need not, and if well advised, should not, give reasons. There is 
probably a lot of good sense in that, in the general run of case”.87 The second difference is said to 
lie in whether there is a right vested in the person affected by a decision to be heard by the 
decision maker. While the person affected by a public decision usually has an independent right 
to be heard, the person affected by the decision of a fiduciary may be required to be heard only 
insofar as this is necessary for the fiduciary to become duly informed of matters relevant to the 
decision: “The difference between the public law and the trust approach is that the former focuses 
on the individual's opportunity to be heard before a decision, whereas the trust concept focuses on 
the information available to the person making the decision.”88 
Against this background, an analysis of the administrator’s position proves instructive. Take first 
the duty to give reasons, which, as noted, is a particularly important aspect of the rationality test 
in the context of public decision making.89 The administrator is unlike other fiduciaries in having 
a duty, not merely to give reasons, but to explain them. After he has picked the objective he will 
be pursuing, the administrator “shall make a statement setting out proposals for achieving the 
purpose of administration. [This] statement must, in particular… where applicable, explain why 
the administrator thinks that the objective mentioned in paragraph 3(1)(a) or (b) cannot be 
 
80 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 410-411 (HL) (Lord 
Diplock). 
81 Edge v Pensions Ombudsman [1991] 4 All ER 546, 567-8. 
82 See e.g. Breadner v Granville-Grossman [2001] Ch 523, [58]. See also Sir Robert Walker, "The Limits 
of the Principle in In re Hastings-Bass (decd.)" [2002] PCB 226, 227-228. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Lightman J has recently provided a useful discussion of the differences in the court’s approach to 
granting remedies for the breach of fiduciary and administrative duties respectively; see Abacus, [29-30]. 
85 Systemised by Walker, “Limits”, 228, who stated that the public law analogy for fiduciary decision 
making “cannot be pressed far in relation to” the two matters to be identified in the text. 
86 Walker, ibid., notes that there might “perhaps” be such a duty “when pension fund trustees have to 
determine an issue as to a member’s state of health”. 
87 Robert Walker J (as he then was) in Scott v National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural 
Beauty [1998] 2 All ER 705. 
88 R v Charity Commissioners for England and Wales, ex parte Baldwin (2000) 33 HLR 538, [49] (Jack 
Beatson QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge).  
89 H. Woolf, J. Jowell and A.P. Le Sueur, de Smith, Woolf & Jowell’s Principles of Judicial Review 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 12-019, including authority cited at fn 59. 
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achieved.”90 This requirement is, quite simply, the single most important element to ensuring both 
that (i) company rescue is put at the heart of the administration regime, and that (ii) the 
administrator is made accountable to all those interested in the debtor’s undertaking. It is 
primarily through this explanation of his reasons that the administrator will show that he is 
complying with his duty to act in the interests of the creditors as a whole,91 and not just, say, in 
the interests of the company’s main bank. And it is primarily this explanation which renders 
meaningful the statutory right (particularly) of junior creditors to determine whether they should 
call the administrator to account as to what, as noted, is the most fundamental and far-reaching of 
his decisions.92 The explanation must obviously consist (among other things) of those facts the 
existence of which persuaded the administrator not to pursue company or business rescue. So it 
would be inconceivable for Parliament to have allowed for the possibility that the whole panoply 
of statutory protections built around the meaningfulness of this explanation would be defeated by 
the simple expedient of the administrator making factual assertions whose truth or grounds could 
not then be examined by the court. 
 
This is amply borne out by the statutory language. Notice that the administrator is not required to 
give or disclose or state or reveal why he thinks the company or the business cannot be saved, as 
the case might be. In fact, he is required to “explain” why he thinks thus. It is clear that “explain” 
is more demanding, in terms of the duty it places on the administrator, than “give” or “state” or 
“disclose” etc.93 So exactly what does it mean in this context? Here are two possibilities. To 
explain his thinking might mean to make it plain or understandable, perhaps by avoiding jargon 
or technical terminology. Let me call this the ‘explanation as clarification’ view. Alternatively, 
explaining why the administrator came to think that the company or business were beyond rescue 
might require him to account for his thinking, to show what factors led him to think the way that 
he did. If these factors conflict — so that some count in favour of a quick liquidation while others 
argue for giving the company a second chance, say — then the administrator, on this view of 
“explain”, would have to show what weight he gave to these various factors. And importantly, to 
explain the administrator’s thinking in this sense requires him to avoid resorting to stock 
formulae, culled from his firm’s ‘Precedents’ file, that do not connect sufficiently to the facts at 
hand in this case. This is the ‘explanation as justification’ view. 
 
Now these two views of what it means to “explain” the administrator’s thinking may not be 
mutually exclusive, and both might play a role. However, I suggest that the second sense of 
“explain” is more important in this context.94 The administrator must not only make his decision 
 
90 Para 49(2)(b). 
91 Para 3(2). 
92 Through Paras 74 and 75; see below. 
93 Compare ‘State the fundamental principles of the general theory of relativity’ with ‘Explain the 
fundamental principles of the general theory of relativity’; or ‘I will now disclose what the court held in 
this case’ with ‘I will now explain what the court held in this case’. 
94 Further, the administrator may need to refer to statistical tests of company ‘survivability’ or other 
technical judgements to justify his thinking which are not readily understandable, especially by non-experts. 
Here, the two notions of ‘to explain’ are in tension, and I submit — in view of the role the requirement to 
explain plays in the legislation, as explained in the text — that the need for the administrator to account for 
his thinking must outweigh the need for him to be easily understood. For notable examples of survivability 
(sometimes called ‘bankruptcy emergence’) tests, see e.g. Merxe Tudela and Garry Young, ‘A Merton-
model approach to assessing the default risk of UK public companies’ (London: Bank of England Working 
Paper No. 194, 2003); Ran Barniv, Anurag Agarwal and Robert Leach, ‘Predicting bankruptcy resolution’ 
(2002) 29 Journal of Business Finance 497; S. Campbell, ‘Predicting bankruptcy reorganization for closely 
held firms’ (1996) 10 Accounting Horizons 12; M. Peel and N. Wilson, ‘The liquidation/merger alternative 
— Some results for the UK corporate sector’ (1989) 10 Managerial and Decision Economics 209; 
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rationally, he must also account for his “thinking”. He must explain the facts, factors and 
considerations which, in his view, make his decision the appropriate one under the governing 
legislation. The legislation clearly seems to be shifting the burden of proof from any potential 
challengers to his decision having to demonstrate that he failed to comply with the requirements 
of rationality, to the administrator having to show that his decision, his “thinking”, succeeds in 
being rational. 
 
Consider now the question of whether those affected by the administrator’ decision have the right 
to be heard. The administrator is clearly under no duty to consult creditors (or indeed members) 
before reaching his initial decision about which objective to pursue. However, he must then 
formulate proposals about how he intends to achieve his chosen objective. These must be placed 
before a creditors’ meeting, and significantly, they must be accompanied by the administrator’s 
explanation, if appropriate, of why he thinks one or both of the higher priority objectives cannot 
be achieved.95 The creditors will of course have the opportunity to decide whether they consider 
his proposals acceptable, and in this regard, an important consideration will no doubt be whether 
they find his explanation of his choice of objective credible. The administrator may not put his 
proposal into effect unless it has been approved at the creditors’ meeting.96 The administrator, 
then, is different from other fiduciaries — and indeed from most public decision makers — in not 
only being under a duty to consult with those affected by his decision, but by also being subject, 
in his ability to put his decision into action, to a significant (though not absolute) veto by an 
appropriate majority of them.  
 
Put these two factors together against the context set by the foregoing discussion and we can see 
that the administrator’s duties to explain his reasons and to consult with those affected by his 
decision place him close indeed, on the continuum of duty-laden decision making, to those 
subject to the full-blown rationality requirements of public law. So the administrator’s decision 
about which objective to pursue will have to be accounted for, and if necessary, defended by 
reference to standards that, on the above analysis, will not be that much less demanding than 
those to which public law subjects those within its domain. When one examines the statutory text, 
this conclusion is hard to avoid: objectivity veritably oozes from the statutory pores. Borrowing 
from the law governing public decision making, it is firmly established that where statute requires 
reasons to be given,  
 
those reasons must be both “adequate and intelligible”. They must therefore both 
rationally relate to the evidence in the case, and be comprehensible in themselves. [A] 
decision may be struck down where an applicant can show substantial prejudice resulting 
from a failure on the part of the decision-maker to demonstrate how an issue of law had 
been resolved or a disputed issue of fact decided, or by “demonstrating some other lack 
of reasoning which raised substantial doubts over the decision-making process”.97 
Of particular interest in the present context will be the administrator’s assessment of the facts 
upon which he decides which objective to pursue. Normally, courts are reluctant to interfere with 
 
Cornelius Casey, Victor McGee and Clyde Stickney, ‘Discriminating between reorganized and liquidated 
firms in bankruptcy’ (1986) 61 The Accounting Review 249. 
95 The administrator is not under a duty to call a creditors’ meeting if he thinks the company has 
insufficient property to enable a distribution to unsecured creditors except of funds ring-fenced by virtue of 
s. 176A, or if he thinks neither of the two higher priority objectives can be achieved; para 52(1). However, 
he must summon a meeting if requested to do so by creditors holding at least 10% of the company’s debt; 
para 52(2).  
96 Paras 49-56. 
97 Woolf, Jowell and Le Sueur, Judicial Review, 12-019, including authority cited in fns. 60-2. 
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the primary decision-maker’s assessment of facts.98 However, it is submitted that the 
administrator’s findings of fact can be examined by the court on one of two bases. First, the 
statutory menu of options set out above might be interpreted as not conferring upon him the 
power to pursue objectives (b) and (c) “unless” or “only if” he “thinks” certain facts are present.99
On this interpretation, the existence of these facts is a condition precedent to the administrator 
being able to pursue lower-priority objectives. For the administrator to choose to pursue lower 
priority objectives in the absence of these facts is for him to exceed his powers. It follows that the 
administrator’s decision that these facts exist would be open to review by the court.100 On the 
second and alternative interpretation of the statutory menu of options, the administrator has the 
power to pursue any of the objectives, but this power must be used for its proper purposes.101 
Now the administrator’s finding and assessment of the facts is unavoidably central to the question 
how properly to exercise his power. And as I have argued above, ensuring the proper exercise of 
the administrator’s power to select an objective for administration is quite crucial to whether the 
Parliamentary intention of enhancing rescue prospects for troubled companies and the office-
holder’s accountability would be brought to fruition. It is submitted, therefore, that this is a 
paradigmatic case where “Parliament intended [decision makers] rationally to relate the evidence 
and their reasoning to the decision… which they are charged with making.”102 
It follows that, on any available interpretation of paragraphs 3 and 49, the adequacy and cogency 
of the facts — as the administrator reasonably perceives them to be — that form the basis of his 
exercise of the power to pursue one of the objectives will be open to examination by the court. 
Also as part of the rationality test, in explaining his reasons for not pursuing one or other of the 
first two objectives, the administrator will have to show that he did not take into account 
something as a fact which was wrong, that he did not misunderstand the facts on the basis of 
which he reached his decision, that none of his decisions depends upon “no evidence”, and that, 
taken as a whole, the evidence is reasonably capable of supporting his findings of fact.103 
4. HOW WOULD THE ADMINISTRATOR CHOOSE THE OBJECTIVE OF 
ADMINISTRATION? 
 
Given that the administrator is accountable regarding his choice of the objective to be pursued by 
the administration, how should he go about making this choice? Under paragraph 3, set out 
above, the administrator must choose whichever objective is in the best interests of the creditors 
as a group. Relating this to the discussion above, we can see that he may only resort to objective 
(c) — realising the company’s assets for distribution to secured and preferential creditors — if 
the company is in economic distress. The administrator’s basic aim here is to ascertain whether 
there is a going concern surplus, or in other words, whether the value of the company’s business 
as a going concern is greater than the net realisable value of its assets if sold off piecemeal. If 
there is a going concern surplus, then objective (c) is out of bounds. Another way of saying the 
same thing is that economic distress marks the boundary between the first two potential purposes 
of administration (preservation of the company or its business as a going concern, respectively) 
and the third one (piecemeal liquidation of its assets). So before the administrator can fix the third 
 
98 Ibid., 4-055 to 4-067. 
99 That is, those facts set out in paras 3(3) and 3(4). 
100 See e.g. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Khawaja [1984] AC 74. 
101 Determined, once again, by reference to paras 3(3) and 3(4). 
102 Woolf, Jowell, and Le Sueur, Judicial Review, p. 142, 4-067(6).  
103 Woolf, Jowell, and Le Sueur, Judicial Review, p. 461-2, 12-021. 
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objective as the one he will pursue, he must reach the conclusion that the company is in economic 
distress.104
So much for objective (c). But what about the first two objectives? How would the administrator 
decide whether properly to save the company or only its business as a going concern? In another 
paper, John Armour and I have analysed (a) the relative merits of pursuing either a reorganisation 
or a going concern sale, the main ways in which, respectively, a company or only its business 
might be rescued, and (b) the way that valid forfeiture clauses of the sort upheld in Money 
Markets International Ltd v London Stock Exchange Ltd,105 will shape this decision.106 In this 
paper, I want to discuss the importance — to the decision as to which of the first two objectives to 
pursue — of the administrator’s assessment of the nature of the distressed company’s 
management.  
 
It was noted above that it would sometimes be essential to rescuing a company as a going concern 
to preserve in place at least some of its pre-distress managers (since that would be necessary to 
ensuring that the best value was derived from the company’s assets). It has also been noted that 
the day to day affairs of most companies undergoing formal insolvency proceedings are run by 
those holding significant chunks of equity in them.107 It is now suggested that this overlap of 
functions is in fact essential to the viability of some companies, especially smaller ones. Given 
perhaps the location or nature of their business, and ultimately in all cases, given their turnover, 
such companies would not be able to afford to hire outside managers. For them to be able to 
operate profitably, their shareholders would also have to be their managers. This is probably true 
of a majority of companies undergoing formal insolvency proceedings, and is likely to be true of 
most companies undergoing administration.108 
These observations have important implications for the administrator’s choice of objective. 
Barring the very unlikely situation where the company is restored to financial health during the 
currency of administration itself, the fulfilment of this objective would take the form of the 
conclusion of a CVA, scheme of arrangement or reorganisation. The company’s creditors would 
be promised a payment on their claims (usually, one significantly lower than their face value) at a 
date some time in the future. Alternatively, they might be offered an equity stake in the 
reorganised company. The company existing bank (or another one109) might have to be persuaded 
to inject further funds to facilitate a reorganisation. Other counter-parties might need to be 
convinced not to insist on protective measures (demanding cash on delivery, paying lower prices 
for the company’s goods to discount for the uncertainty that it would fulfil its warranties or be 
able to provide replacement parts, etc.) in their dealings with the company. All of this turns, very 
 
104 It should be emphasised once again that this is meant to apply to economically distressed companies 
which are or are likely to become unable to pay their debts as they arise. In other words, economic distress 
is a necessary though not a sufficient reason for the company’s assets to be liquidated piecemeal. The 
reasons are explained in a lengthy footnote above. 
105 [2002] 1 WLR 1150. 
106 Armour and Mokal, “Corporate Rescue”. 
107 Recall the evidence discussed in a footnote above, indicating that most companies undergoing formal 
insolvency proceedings are small and closely held. 
108 Ibid. It is in fact one of the stated aims of the new legislation to draw closely-held companies to use the 
administration procedure; see e.g. Mr. Douglas Alexander, Minister for E-Commerce and Competitiveness, 
Hansard HC committee, Column Number: 549: “we want to encourage smaller companies, many of which 
will have owner-managers, to use the procedure as a rescue vehicle at the early stages of financial 
difficulty”.  
109 See Armour and Mokal’s discussion of the administrator’s duty in searching for funding in “Corporate 
Rescue”. 
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crucially, on whether the administrator has confidence in the competence of the company’s post-
administration management, and on whether he can bring these other parties to share that 
confidence. After all, the management would be responsible (perhaps subject to oversight by a 
CVA supervisor) for delivering on all the promises made to procure a CVA, scheme or 
reorganisation.  
 
It follows that where saving the company would mean retaining (some of) the pre-administration 
shareholder-managers in place, an important reason that might lead the administrator to think that 
achievement of this objective would not be reasonably practicable110 would be that he did not 
have confidence in the competence of the managers.111 In addition, saving the company would 
not then achieve a better result for its creditors than they would under management more capable 
of delivering the performance required to make a success of the CVA, scheme or reorganisation. 
The administrator would then be justified in moving down the hierarchy of objectives and 
attempting only to save the company’s business (by arranging a going concern sale). 
 
The factors leading the administrator to lack confidence in the management would be immensely 
varied. He might feed off the experience of the company’s main bank in dealing with the 
managers in the past. He would form his own impressions during his visits to the company’s 
premises and his meetings with key functionaries, including of course the managers themselves. 
However, it is possible to locate certain generic signs that might allow him to conclude, in a way 
defensible at law, that the pre-administration management does not deserve confidence. 
 
First and most obviously, managers would not be capable of being trusted if, on the eve of 
administration, they operated in disregard of creditors’ interests.112 For the administrator to find 
evidence of fraudulent or wrongful trading would, needless to say, require him to consider 
arranging for appropriate legal action to be brought against them.113 Even if the evidence 
possessed by the administrator does not meet the legal standards required to establish either of 
these statutory wrongs, however, the administrator might still come to think that he could not in 
good faith advise creditors and other counter-parties to place their confidence in the managers.114 
So for example, the managers might have manipulated the company’s accounts as it hurtled 
towards administration. They might have tried to factor debts, sold and then leased back some of 
their own equipment, or borrowed indirectly (via associated companies or joint ventures etc.), all 
in an effort to conceal how much the company had borrowed. They might have tried to stave off 
 
110 Para 3(3)(a). 
111 This is consistent with evidence as to the current practice of IPs; see e.g. Gary Cook, Naresh Pandit, 
David Milman and Carolynne Mason, Small Firm Rescue: A Multi-Method Empricial Study of Company 
Voluntary Arrangements (London: Centre for Business Performance, 2003), 22. 
112 Evidence about the current process of acquiring creditor approval for a CVA is consistent with this: 
“some creditors will be beyond convincing [as to the desirability of entering into a CVA] where they 
believe the directors to have been feckless or dishonest, for example, the persistent non-payment of PAYE 
and VAT, one of the Voluntary Arrangement Service’s over-riding reasons not to support a CVA”; see 
Cook et al, Small Firm Rescue, 14. See also ibid., at p. 33: “creditors are willing to forgive debt in 
situations where they believe the company directors have been straight in their dealings with them and have 
not been the cause of their company’s problems through deceit or recklessness.” For further evidence, see 
pp. 37, 39 and 40. 
113 IA ss. 213 (fraudulent trading) and 214 (wrongful trading) restrict the availability of these actions to a 
liquidator. For an examination of the latter, see e.g. Mokal, “An agency cost analysis of the wrongful 
trading provisions” [2000] CLJ 335. 
114 The discussion in the remainder of this section draws on and adapts the thoughtful work of John 
Argenti; See Corporate Collapse — The Causes And Symptoms (London: McGraw-Hill, 1976) and 
Predicting Corporate Failure (London: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, 1984).  
25
the appearance of insolvency by causing its accounts to give inflated values to intangible assets 
(goodwill, brand names and other intellectual property, etc.). Or they might have inflated the 
company’s sales or its receivables, or had its non-real estate assets revalued upwards. Finally, 
they might have ‘left cheques in the drawer’, attempting to reduce the appearance of the 
company’s liabilities while keeping its overdraft within limits. And so on. An appropriate 
combination of some of these factors might incline the administrator towards thinking that the 
company’s creditors could not reasonably be asked to believe that the managers would not resort 
to these tactics once again, were they to perceive that they were unable to fulfil the promises 
concerning the company’s performance made to procure a reorganisation. It would then follow 
that the creditors as a group would be better off if the company were not saved. 
 
Second and having gained a thorough familiarity with the company’s history, the administrator 
might develop concerns about the structural profile of its senior management team. The company 
might be dominated by one person — the managing director or controlling shareholder — who is 
inflexible in his views and not amenable to advice from colleagues. Or the team might be 
unbalanced, consisting predominantly of optimists (pessimists), or of extroverts (introverts), or of 
‘salesman types’ (‘accountant types’) or of ‘entrepreneurs’ (‘organisation types’), etc. So the 
balance of personality types or skills required to deliver on the administration promises might be 
lacking.115 There might be too much friction between the management and workforce, and this 
might be leading to a high turnover of staff. This would drive away experienced staff with 
company-specific skills. Or the management might be excessively cosy with the workforce, many 
of whom might be so entrenched as to be unable to bring about much needed change. And 
especially in family-run companies, there might be problems in ensuring continuity of good 
management, with unsuitable junior family members automatically next in line for imminent 
succession, or on the other hand, no potential successors at all. Once again, an appropriate 
combination of some or all of these factors might contribute to the administrator’s thinking that 
the company is not viable.  
 
Finally, the existing management’s relationship with its main creditor or other potential lenders 
would be an important consideration. If in the run-up to administration, lenders were faced with 
late or inaccurate accounts, an absence of company-provided information, a difficulty in tracking 
down important management figures, misuse of the agreed overdraft or violations of it, or 
returned cheques, it would be unsurprising if they lost confidence in the managers. Not only will 
this impact on their willingness agree to a reorganisation or CVA by countenancing the 
perpetuation of the management in the post-administration period. It might also, crucially, 
convince them not to pledge further funds to the company. In this case, attempting to save it 
might well not be practicable.116 
A reasonably competent administrator, faced with some of the factors just discussed, might 
justifiably come to think that it would be more worthwhile attempting to preserve the going 
concern value of the company’s business and not the company itself. It is important to note, 
however, that in some cases, a business might be salvageable only if it retains key members of its 
pre-administration managerial team. Once again especially in the small-company sector, a 
manager might have highly specialised skills or other attributes essential to the survival of the 
business (e.g. familiarity with local suppliers who would not offer to others the discounts they 
provide to him, or the trust of local customers who would abandon the business in question in 
 
115 In compliance with the rationality test, the administrator’s judgements on this count would have to have 
some reasonable grounding in the available evidence. 
116 It is important to emphasise, however, that this observation is subject to the administrator’s duty to 
consider alternative sources of funding; see Armour and Mokal, “Corporate Rescue”. 
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favour of the nearby supermarket if he were to leave). One possibility here might of course be to 
acquire new equity holders and to retain the key manager in place only qua manager. However, 
suppose that a business thus symbiotically linked with key managers also falls in the category 
described above — namely, one which is not viable except by concentrating the role of (main) 
manager and (main) shareholder in one and the same person. In such a case, the objective of 
saving the business cannot be cleaved apart from trying to save the company. So if the 
administrator found himself thus confronted both by a business dependent on the shareholder-
managers, and shareholder-managers whose competence to lead the business through the post-
administration period he has reason to doubt, he would naturally have to assess and compare the 
expected costs and benefits of retaining the managers’ services from the point of view of the 
company’s creditors as a whole. 
 
5. THE ADMINISTRATOR’S INCENTIVES AND CHALLENGES TO HIS DECISIONS 
 
The Enterprise Act provides three routes through which the administrator’s decisions might be 
challenged. Paragraph 74(1) empowers any creditor or member of the company to apply for relief 
on the basis that the administrator has acted or is acting or proposes to act so as unfairly to harm 
his interests. Paragraph 74(2) provides any creditor or member with the power to challenge the 
administrator for not performing his functions with reasonable speed or with reasonable 
efficiency. And paragraph 75 empowers the court to examine the administrator’s conduct for 
misfeasance. My interest is in the first two routes for challenging the administrator, and my 
purpose is to provide an explanation of the sort of factors which might lead a creditor or member 
to question whether the administrator was complying with his duties. 
 
I suggest that there are three quite crucial observations (hereafter, the ‘motivational factors’) 
which provide the background against which the three duties are to be understood. First, an 
overwhelming majority of administrators could be expected to be appointed by the distressed 
company’s bank. It has been argued elsewhere that it is in the interests of everyone interested in 
the debtor company’s business both for the debtor’s main bank to be given the right to appoint an 
administrator, and for it to be able to do so out of court.117 However, it should be obvious the 
benefits from allowing this to happen come at a cost. As noted above, in a substantial proportion 
of cases, the bank would be oversecured or would have alternative, cheaper means to ensure 
repayment (e.g. enforcing directors’ guarantees) not requiring the maximisation of the value of 
the debtor’s estate. The bank would not therefore be the company’s residual claimant, and there 
would be a divergence of interests between it and the actual residual claimants (shareholding 
directors who have also lent money to the company, Crown, employee- and trade creditors, etc). 
What is problematic here is that IPs would rightly expect most of their work (i.e. future 
appointments as administrators) to come from the banks. They would thus have strong incentives, 
in situations where the bank’s interests diverge from those of other creditors, of developing a 
reputation for favouring the former.118 
The other two reasons would, I hope, prove to be only transitional ones. The IPs who are 
appointed administrators would of course be the very individuals who have hitherto been acting 
as receivers. This means they would have been socialised in a milieu where the interests of 
secured creditors — mainly banks — reigned supreme. There would therefore be a tendency for 
the professional judgements of these IPs to be shaped by those interests. In the transitional period 
 
117 Mokal, ‘Floating charge’, Section III; see also Armour and Frisby, “Rethinking Receivership”. 
118 In the context of receivership, this problem is discussed by David Milman and David Mond, Security 
and Corporate Rescue (Manchester, Hodgsons, 1999). See also Armour and Mokal, “Corporate Rescue”. 
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as the new law ‘beds down’, the inclination of these IPs would be to continue acting as they have 
done before, qua receivers. Once again, therefore, in situations where the bank’s interests diverge 
from those of junior claimants, the decisions and actions of the IP — now under a duty qua
administrator to act in the interests of all the creditors — would tend to be inapposite. And 
finally, there is anecdotal evidence of some feeling amongst both IPs and the lawyers who 
generally act for banks, that the new law would not make any noticeable difference, that the new 
administration is nothing but administrative receivership disguised so as to make it more 
generally (and internationally) acceptable. This ‘business as usual’ view is of course highly 
cynical and quite unsustainable, both because it is based on an ignorance of (or perhaps a refusal 
to acknowledge) the social harm done by receivership (as identified above), and because it is 
premised on regarding as meaningless the extensive consultation and legislative process from 
which the new administration has emerged.119 
Given these motivational factors, I suggest that compliance with the duty to act in the interests of 
all the creditors as a group, and the duties to act with reasonable speed and efficiency would have 
to be carefully monitored by the courts, especially during the initial years after the introduction of 
the new procedure. If the courts are able, through their approach to the interpretation of these 
duties, to send the correct signal sufficiently early on about the way in which administration must 
be different from administrative receivership, the chances that the legislation would achieve its 
stated objectives would be greatly improved. The amount of future litigation could also then be 
expected to be low. 
 
Let us start with the duty to act in the interests of the creditors as a whole. This is modelled on the 
duty of directors of a solvent company to act in the interests of the company as a whole, a duty 
the scope of which is well-understood as determined by what the directors think — and not what 
the court thinks — to be the interests of the company.120 Of course, if a decision is taken in bad 
faith, or is clearly irrational — such that no reasonable director could have thought it to be in the 
interests of the company — then this will raise an evidential presumption that the directors did 
not in fact consider it to be in the interests of creditors. Presumptively, this should hold for 
administrators as well.  
 
In the administration context, however, the motivational factors sketched out above provide 
reasons for going further. The board of a solvent company consists of, or is chosen121 or at least 
not disapproved by, (a majority of) the shareholders (the residual claimants), who retain the 
power to remove directors.122 On the other hand, administrators will mostly be appointed by 
banks (which, as discussed above, are often not the residual claimants), and as officers of the 
court, may not be removed except by court order.123 The influence of the interests of (at least a 
majority of) the solvent company’s residual claimants over directorial decision making, derived 
from the shareholders’ ability to select or at least disapprove of the board, does not therefore find 
an analogue in administration. The bank would of course enjoy the advantages provided by, inter 
 
119 For what it is worth (over and above the very fact that the new legislation exists, was put on the books 
after a long process of consultation, and emphatically aims to bring about change to the way things were 
under receivership), Lord McIntosh of Haringey noted on behalf of the government that “it simply was not 
true” that is would be “business as usual for receivers turned administrators”, that administrators would not 
continue in the footsteps of receivers by continuing “to sell off assets in a quick and dirty sale simply to 
cover the secured creditor’s debts [while] justifying such actions as being better for the creditors in the 
short term”; 21 Oct 2002: Column 1101. 
120 Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch. 304.  
121 See Companies (Tables A to F) Regs. 1985, Table A, art. 73. 
122 Companies Act 1985, s. 303. 
123 Para 88. 
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alia, its ability to offer or withhold future appointments to the IP. So the IP’s interests will lie 
with the bank’s interests. It follows that the duty of impartiality inherent in the obligation to act in 
the interests of creditors as a whole will be a main bulwark for junior claimants against IP 
partiality in favour of the bank.  
 
We can expect the problem to be most acute when the bank is marginally oversecured or 
marginally undersecured, i.e. when the value of the collateral (taking into account any additional 
security also available to the bank) just about covers the bank debt (and administration costs) or 
falls just short of doing so. Now if the company or its business are essentially viable, the 
administrator’s duty would be to seek to preserve them. However, the bank — worried about the 
risk of deterioration in the value of the collateral124 — would prefer an early sale of the assets. 
And due to the motivational factors, the administrator would tend to favour the bank. The conflict 
here would revolve around (a) the objective the administration should pursue, (b) the time it 
should last, and (c) the level of effort the administrator should put into finding ways of rescuing 
the company or business as a going concern. Where the bank is marginally over- or undersecured, 
then, the courts will have reason carefully to scrutinise these three types of decision, keeping in 
mind the tendency for administrator bias in favour of whichever course of action most quickly 
realises the value of the bank’s collateral. 
 
The duty to act reasonably quickly and efficiently will, prima facie, require the administrator to 
perform his functions as quickly and efficiently as is practicable under the circumstances as he 
reasonably believes them to be.125 Efficiency here evidently means cost-effectiveness.126 
Crucially, however, the credibility of the administrator’s claim that he reasonably believed some 
or other circumstances to exist must once again be assessed in the context set by the three 
motivational factors sketched out above. Where the bank is undersecured (again taking into 
account all types of security available to it), it would of course wish to ensure that the 
administrator spent only that time, undertook only those tasks, and incurred only those costs, 
which were reasonably necessary for the achievement of the purpose of administration. And the 
administrator, with an eye to future appointments being sent his way, would have an incentive to 
do likewise. The situation would change, however, where the bank is significantly oversecured. 
Now the bank would have less reason to fear an administration lasting longer than it needs to, and 
less reason to prevent the administrator engaging in unnecessary activity and incurring 
unnecessary costs. In either case, the bank would expect its collateral to continue to cover its 
debt. Just as they are in the receivership system, the costs of this wastefulness would be borne by 
junior claimants. It follows that in situations where the bank is significantly oversecured, the 
courts would have to scrutinise the administrator’s behaviour keeping in mind this tendency 
towards delay and the inflation of costs. 
 
I suggest that the courts will be guided here by the principle that the administrator is “for all 
practical purposes a trustee of the monies forming part of the insolvent estate and is required to be 
able to justify as prudent every decision made as to its expenditure and to prove and justify every 
 
124 And perhaps in the surety-directors’ resources, who would have an incentive precisely in this situation 
(viz., when they judge the company to be viable) to lend more to the company. 
125 “The duty of a given administrator is clearly to be interpreted in the light of what is reasonably practical 
in the particular circumstances of a case”; Lord McIntosh of Haringey, 21 Oct 2002: Column 1117. 
126 While efficiency has several other technical meanings (discussed in R. Mokal, “On Fairness and 
Efficiency”), legislative history provides no indication that the legislature intended to invoke anything but 
the ordinary, everyday understanding of this term. 
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penny spent.”127 The foremost test will be that of cost-effectiveness itself. Where the undertaking 
of a procedure or its costs are challenged, the courts would ask how the expected costs (in time 
and money) of undertaking a procedure compare with the value of its expected benefits (whether 
it be the expected rescue of a company or its business or the expected increase in recoveries for 
claimants). Both sides of this equation would be solved by reference to evidence that would 
reasonably have been available to the administrator at the time that the procedure was undertaken.  
 
In the context of a challenge to the costliness of a certain procedure, when judging the 
administrator’s actions in light of the duty of speed and efficiency, the appropriate test would not 
be what the bulk of administrators would do in similar circumstances. The reason is obvious: 
given the structure of administration, the perverse incentive to incur delays and (thus or 
otherwise) to inflate costs can be expected to be endemic, and not merely restricted to some 
individuals or firms.128 Further, the legal obligation is for the administrator to act reasonably 
quickly and efficiently. It is not for him to act as other IPs would have acted under the 
circumstances, nor to act in a way that would be considered quick or efficient by other IPs. It 
goes without saying that in taking its decisions, the court would be assisted by, among other 
things, expert evidence from other IPs about what they would regard as appropriate. However, the 
point would be to examine why a particular procedure was adopted when a less expensive one 
was available, say, or why a certain type of service was charged at a particular rate when an 
analogous service would cost less in a context where the person hiring the relevant service would 
also expect to pay for any wastefulness on the service-provider’s part. Compendiously put, for the 
duty to act efficiently to be meaningful in the contexts where it would be needed the most, it 
would have to be tested not by ‘norm-based’ standards (i.e. by what in normal practice is 
regarded as appropriate) but by ‘criterion-based’ ones (i.e. by asking why this procedure was 
performed at this price in these particular circumstances).129 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
It has been argued that the Enterprise Act 2002 has significantly changed the way those dealing 
with distressed companies are required to behave. The motivation for this change lies in the ways 
in which administrative receivership was destructive of social value (in terms of unnecessary job 
losses and other resource misallocations). Three such ways were identified, all linked with the 
fact that receivership ties the office-holder’s duties to the interests of the debtor’s bank. This is 
undesirable because the bank (a) is usually oversecured and thus has little incentive, once 
receivership is underway, to ensure that financially distressed companies would not be wound up 
or their businesses not liquidated, (b) has the benefit of directors’ guarantees, which weakens its 
incentives to ensure the maximisation of the value of the company’s business even in those cases 
where its proprietary security is insufficient to cover what it is owed, and (c) has little incentive in 
either of these cases to control the costs of receiver wastefulness or negligence. These problems 
are compounded by the fact that the supply side of the market for banking services to SMEs is 
significantly monopolistic. 
 
127 G. Lightman, “Office Holders’ Charges: Cost Control and Transparency” (1998) 19(3) Company 
Lawyer 72, 73, explaining (extra-judicially) the effect for insolvency office-holders of Ferris J’s judgment 
in Mirror Group Newspapers plc v Maxwell and others (No 2) [1998] 1 BCLC 638. 
128 Because when the bank is significantly oversecured, all administrators, no longer worried about harming 
their reputation with it, would have a tendency to suffer these perverse incentives. 
129 This analysis is consistent with the systematic and more detailed discussion of the ways in which the 
courts might require administrators to show that they have complied with their duty to act with reasonable 
speed and efficiency in G. Lightman, “Office Holders’ Charges”, and G. Lightman, “The Challenges 
Ahead”, 117-118. 
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In order to remedy these defects, Parliament has imposed upon the administrator the duty to 
attempt a company or business rescue, as appropriate, if either one is in the interests of the 
creditors as a group. This duty is an objective one, is subject to the rationality test, and requires 
the administrator to account for his decision about which objective is to be pursued. The paper 
provided an understanding of company rescue consistent with the explicit text and legislative 
history of the statute, and discussed the importance to the administrator’s decision about whether 
to attempt such a rescue of the quality of the company’s pre-distress management. 
 
Finally, the mechanisms provided by the statute for an aggrieved party to hold the administrator 
to account were discussed. The paper highlighted the importance of three factors. (a) Most 
administrators will be appointed by the company’s main bank. (b) The Insolvency Practitioners 
who act as administrators would be the same individuals who have acted in the past as 
administrative receivers. (c) There has been a paucity of understanding amongst the professionals, 
lawyers and accountants, about the significance of the changes brought about by the Enterprise 
Act. The administrator’s statutory duties to act in the interests of all the creditors as a group and 
to act with reasonable speed and efficiency were examined in the light of these observations. 
 
